A Comparative Analysis in Relation to Informational Self-Determination and Privacy: : The Icelandic Health Sector Database Decision and The German Census Act Decision by Ulfarsdottir, Anna Kristin Jack
  
 
A Comparative Analysis in Relation to  
Informational Self-Determination and Privacy: 
 
The Icelandic Health Sector Database Decision and 







Candidate number: 8003 
Supervisor: Dr. Lee A. Bygrave 
Deadline for submission: December 1, 2007 
 
Number of words: 17.085 (max. 18.000)  
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the  
Award of the Degree  
Master in Laws in Information and Communication Technology of the 
University of Oslo 
 
26.11.2007
Table of Contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Scope and Aims 1 
1.2 Methodological Considerations 2 
1.3 Use of Terms 3 
2 THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 5 
3 THE ICELANDIC HEALTH SECTOR DATABASE DECISION (2003) 9 
3.1 Background Information 9 
3.1.1 Political Disagreement 9 
3.1.2 The Health Sector Database Act No. 139/1998 9 
3.2 The Decision in Short 10 
3.2.1 Plaintiff’s Claims and Formal Authority 11 
3.2.2 The Decision of the District Court 11 
3.2.3 The Decision of the Supreme Court 12 
4 THE GERMAN CENSUS ACT DECISION (1983) 14 
4.1 Background Information 14 
4.1.1 Political Disagreement 14 
4.1.2 The Census Act 1983 14 
4.2 The Census Act Decision in Short 15 
4.2.1 The Claims of the Complainants 15 
4.2.2 The Government’s Defence 15 
4.2.3 The Court’s Decision 16 
 I
5 COMPARISON OF THE HEALTH SECTOR DATABASE AND CENSUS ACT 
DECISIONS 19 
5.1 Comparison of Formality 19 
5.2 Political Controversy of the Acts 19 
5.3 The Time Factor 20 
5.4 Decisions Based on National Constitutional Rights Only 20 
5.5 Importance of Correct Information 21 
5.6 Legitimate Access to the Data 22 
5.7 Differentiation of Purpose for Collected Data 23 
5.8 The Value of On-line Data Access 24 
5.9 A Right to Refuse Participation 26 
5.10 Informational Self-Determination in the Census Act Decision 28 
5.10.1 Limitations on the Right of Informational Self-Determination 29 
5.11 Informational Self-Determination in the Health Sector Database Decision 30 
5.11.1 Expanded Right to Informational Self-Determination 32 
5.12 Further Analysis of the Right to Informational Self-Determination 34 
5.12.1 Reasonable Expectations of Data Subjects 34 
5.12.2 Data and Identifiability 36 
5.12.3 Concept of Suitable Safeguards 39 
5.12.4 Clarity of legal framework 41 






The author thanks Dr. Lee A. Bygrave for his valuable guidance and supervision 
writing the thesis. The author is also grateful for the assistance of Marta Herkenhoff 
librarian at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights and Anne Gunn Bekken librarian at 
the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law. Special thanks to my brother 
Guðmundur Freyr Úlfarsson for proofreading the thesis and Hlín Lilja Sigfúsdóttir for 
collecting and sending reference material from Iceland. At last but not least, thanks to my 





1.1 Scope and Aims 
The scope of this thesis is an analysis of the Health Sector Database decision1 by 
the Icelandic Supreme Court from the year 2003 and a comparison with the twenty 
years older Census Act decision2 by the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany. The 
comparative analysis will be in relation to informational self-determination and privacy. 
The reason for this analysis is the author’s personal interest in the Icelandic case as 
a former director of the Monitoring Committee of the Icelandic Health Sector Database. 
It is interesting to compare the Health Sector Database decision to the Census Act 
decision because both found a controversial Act unconstitutional and in breach of 
information privacy. 
The Census Act decision has been regarded as a landmark decision in relation to 
information privacy. The Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged a right to 
informational self-determination as a constitutional right3 in Germany in the Census 
Act Decision. The concept of informational self-determination had been used by 
scholars some years before like Westin4 but this term had not been referred to in a 
court’s decision before, to the best of the author’s knowledge. 
                                                
 
This thesis presents the Courts’ reasoning for their decisions. Week points are 
criticized and attention drawn to interesting questions that perhaps were left unanswered 
by the courts. Finally, the objective is to seek an answer to the question if a right to 
 
1 Icelandic Supreme Court (ISC), case no. 151/2003, p. 4153-4181. 
2 Judgment of the First Senate of 15 December 1983 - 1 BvR 209/83 et al. Federal Constitutional Court, 
Karlsruhe. 
3 The Federal Constitutional Court concluded that informational self-determination was a separate right 
for the citizens, distinct from other rights. The right is drawn from the right to freely develop one’s 
personality and from the right to human dignity of the Basic Law and is therefore a constitutional right. 
Cf. section 4.2.3. 
4 Cf. section 2. p. 7. 
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informational self-determination can be regarded as a separate fundamental right in 
Europe. The answer is based on this analysis of the two previously mentioned decisions 
and by examining case law from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.5 
Informational self-determination cannot be regarded as a fundamental right in Europe 
unless there is some evidence of acknowledgement from the Strasbourg Court in that 
direction. 
 
First, the thesis presents a brief background of the environment that privacy as a 
human right has emerged in. Then some background information on the Icelandic 
Health Sector Database Act is introduced, including a discussion of the facts and 
conclusion of the Health Sector Database decision, both from the District Court and the 
Supreme Court of Iceland. The thesis also presents a discussion of the German Census 
Act and the Census Act decision, facts of the case, and conclusions relevant to this 
thesis.  
This is followed by the comparative analysis of the two decisions. There are some 
major similarities such as both cases involved a personal data collection and processing 
from the whole nation based on a controversial and highly political Act. Both decisions 
were made by each country’s high court, where both courts decided there had been a 
breach of fundamental rights protected by each country’s constitution. 
1.2 Methodological Considerations 
This analysis uses the original Icelandic text of the Health Sector Database decision 
and the Health Sector Database Act. English translations are available on the Internet 
and those are cited in this thesis. Official translations of the Icelandic Constitution, 
Health Sector Database Act, Data Protection Act, Freedom of Information Act and the 
Health Sector Database regulation are available. However, Internet resources make 
available only an unofficial translation of the Health Sector Database decision itself.  
An English translation of the Census Act decision by Riedel is relied upon in this 
thesis.6 This translation also includes comments on the Census Act by the judges of the 
                                                 
5 Cf. European Court of Human Rights at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ 
6 Riedel: Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe [FCC, K], Human Rights Law Journal [HRLJ], vol. 5, 
No. 1, 1984, p. 94-116. 
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Federal Constitutional Court. An English translation of the text of the 1983 Census Act 
could not be located. A translation of the German Basic Law from the website of the 
UISCOMP Comparative Law Society, published with permission of the Goethe-Institut 
Inter-Nationes, is used in this thesis. English translation of the German Data Protection 
Act and Freedom of Information Act can be found on the website of the German 
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information. 
1.3 Use of Terms 
This thesis refers occasionally to the term constitutional in relation to statutes and 
rights. A constitution is a written statute, gathering fundamental principles which the 
state is governed by and basic rights of the people that are governed by that state. 
Constitution should not be as easily amended as other statutes. Constitutional means 
that it is allowed by or contained in the constitution. The author chooses to use the term 
fundamental in relation to the right to privacy and the right to informational self-
determination instead of constitutional.7 That is with reference to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. All 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe (as of November 2007) have ratified the Convention and agreed on 
these fundamental human rights.8 Which fundamental rights are included in the national 
constitutions varies slightly between countries hence the author does not refer to the 
term constitutional unless in relation to specific national constitutions.  
                                                 
7 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, was signed in Rome October 29, 2004 but is not yet 
in force. The Treaty has been the cause of an on-going and interesting debate on European 
constitutionalism. The debate is amongst other things about the relationship of national constitutions with 
an European Union (EU) Constitution and the status of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
this context. In this debate it is also discussed if the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe can 
even be called a constitution in the traditional sense since the EU is not a state but a union of member 
states. This discussion is outside the scope of this analysis but is the reason the author uses the term 
fundamental rather than constitutional. For further information about European constitutionalism see for 
example: The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratification and Beyond, Anneli Albi 
and Jacques Ziller (ed.), 2007; Church and Phinnemore: Understanding the European Constitution: An 
Introduction to the EU Constitutional Treaty, 2006 and The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward?, 
Deirdre Curtin, Alfred Kellerman and Steven Blockmans (ed.), 2005. 
8 A list of member states that have ratified the Convention can be found at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG  
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It is worth mentioning that the official English translation of Art. 71(1) of the 
Icelandic Constitution uses the term “privacy” but the original Icelandic text refers to 
“respect for private life” (is. friðhelgi einkalífs, no. privatlivets fred). The provision is 
doubtless directly referring to Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Various terms used in this thesis such as personal data, data subject, processing, 
controller, and processor are used as they are defined in Art. 2 of the European Union 
(EU) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.9 Data subjects in the thesis are on one hand 
German citizens that were obligated by law to take part in a census and on the other 
hand Icelandic citizens that chose not to opt-out of the Health Sector Database. It should 
be noted that the term processing is a broad term that covers both automatic and manual 
processing, such as collection, organization, storage, alteration, retrieval, use, 
transmission, dissemination, erasure or destruction of the personal data.  
                                                 
9 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
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2 The Fundamental Right to Privacy 
In 1946, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights was established and 
two years later the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made.10 It is not legally 
binding but has a great significance nonetheless. Art. 12 states: “No one should be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interferences or attacks.”11 
The member states of the Council of Europe signed the European Convention on 
Human Right and Fundamental Freedoms in Rome in 1950. The establishment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg12 has given European citizens the 
opportunity to bring cases against their governments when national remedies have been 
exhausted.13 Additional instruments and mechanism have been implemented both by 
the Council of Europe14 and the European Union to strengthen human rights protection. 
Most recent is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter),15 which is 
included in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE).16  
                                                 
10 Drake and Jørgensen: “Introduction” in Human Rights in the Global Information Society, 2006, p. 10-
11. 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights see: http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm 
12 Originally there were established two bodies, the European Commission of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights. This system was revised under protocol no. 11 in 1998 when the two 
bodies were combined as one body, called the European Court of Human Rights. For more information 
about background and procedures of the Court see: Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Peter van Dijk …[et al.], 2006, chapter 1. 
13 Drake and Jørgensen: “Introduction” in Human Rights in the Global Information Society, 2006, p. 23. 
14 For example the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. For more 
information on these bodies see: Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Peter van Dijk …[et al.], 2006, p. 44-46. 
15 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
C 364, 18.12.2000. The Charter was signed in Nice December 7, 2000. For further information on the 
Charter see for example: Polo and den Boer: “The Charter of Fundamental Rights: Novel Method on the 
Way to the Nice Treaty” in The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice, 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) lays upon 
member states both negative and positive obligations17 but there is no legally binding 
mechanism for individuals to enforce their rights.18 Art. 17(1) of ICCPR is almost the 
same as the first sentence of Art. 12 apart from the additional word “unlawful” about 
interferences and attacks. The latter sentence is the same.  
The EU Data Protection Directive gives a harmonized minimum standard for data 
protection in Europe. Countries that are not member states of the EU, but are members 
of the European Economic Area (EEA), i.e. Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein, have 
also based their national data protection law on the EU Data Protection Directive.19  
 
The right to privacy is protected by Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, hereafter called the Convention.20 Art. 8(1) of the Convention states: “Everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” It is similar to Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
                                                                                                                                               
Laursen (ed.), 2006, chapter 24 and Goldsmith: “A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles” in The 
Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Form, Andenas and Usher (ed.), 2003, 
chapter 15. 
16 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, C 310, Volume 
47, 16 December 2004. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not legally binding as of now but will be if 
or when all 27 EU member states (as of November 2007) have ratified the TCE. French voters on May 
29, 2005 and Dutch voters on June 1, 2005 rejected the ratification of the  TCE in national referendums. 
See: The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratification and Beyond, Anneli Albi and 
Jacques Ziller (ed.), 2007, p. 288. For a list of the 27 member states of the EU cf. 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm 
17 Negative obligations meaning not violating the rights listed in the ICCPR and positive obligations 
meaning the state has to implement laws to ensure those rights. 
18 Hosein: “Privacy as Freedom” in Human Rights in the Global Information Society, 2006, p. 132 
19 According to the EEA agreement, that came into force on January 1, 1994, the EEA countries must 
implement directives from certain fields into national law. More information on the EEA agreement can 
be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eea/index.htm 
20 For more information on Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights see: Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, Peter van Dijk …[et al.],  2006, p. 663-750; 
Jacobs and White: The European Convention on Human Rights, 2006, p. 241-299 and Art. 8 with regard 
to data protection: Bygrave: Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties, 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 6, 1998, p. 247-284. 
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but does not use the word privacy and does not refer to attacks on honour and 
reputation. The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted “private life” broader 
than one would presume that the word privacy entails.21 For example in Halford v. 
United Kingdom it was concluded that the claimant could reasonably expect privacy at 
her workplace.22  
The judgments of the European Court of Human Rights show that it has on purpose 
avoided giving an exhaustive definition of private life. In Pretty v. United Kingdom, for 
example, the Strasbourg Court stated: “... the concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term 
not susceptible to exhaustive definition.”23  
The right to privacy has been analysed and defined in many different ways.24 The 
influential definition of Westin25 is about information privacy, the right to decide what 
personal information should be communicated to others and under what circumstances, 
and is quite distinct from the “right to be let alone” as Warren and Brandeis had defined 
privacy in their article from 1890.26 Westin’s definition of privacy is on the other hand 
very similar to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s definition of the concept of 
informational self-determination. That is the right to decide for oneself when and within 
what limits personal information and facts shall be disclosed to others. The concept of 
informational self-determination will be analysed in more detail in sections 5.10 – 5.12. 
 
                                                 
21 Wong: “Privacy: Charting its Developments and Prospects” in Human Rights in the Digital Age, Klang 
and Murray (ed.), 2005, p. 152; Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, Peter 
van Dijk …[et al.],  2006, p. 665. 
22 Halford v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R, para. 46. 
23 Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R, para. 61.  
24 Bygrave: Data Protection Law – Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, 2002, p. 128-129. 
Bygrave has gathered four groups of definitions of privacy by various scholars. 
25 Westin: Privacy and Freedom, 1967, p. 7. Westin’s definition of privacy: “Privacy is the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.” 
26 Warren and Brandeis: The Right of Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 1890. 
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Rehm states that the right to privacy includes two aspects.27 The first aspect refers 
to the individual’s right to keep personal information private and the latter aspect refers 
to the individual’s right to take important decisions. Rehm feels that this separation of 
privacy is helpful for legal clarification of the concept of privacy in an informational 
aspect. The author agrees with Rehm especially in the light of the Pretty v. United 
Kingdom judgment.28 The author thinks on the other hand that the right to 
informational self-determination could not be successfully separated into those aspects 
since it has both elements so closely intertwined.  
                                                 
27 Rehm: Just Judicial Activism? Privacy and Informational Self-Determination in U.S. and German 
Constitutional Law, p. 5, 2000. Rehm suggests that: “...legally separating these two interests, instead of 
lumping them together under the same headline, could help to clarify legal bases, content and limitations 
of at least the right to privacy in its informational aspect.” 
28 Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. Cf. chapter 6, p. 45-46. 
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3 The Icelandic Health Sector Database Decision (2003) 
3.1 Background Information 
3.1.1 Political Disagreement 
The first Bill on the Health Sector Database met strong opposition, especially 
because all Icelanders, living and deceased, were obligated by law to have their health 
information entered into the database. Later the Bill was changed29 but many still 
opposed that the database was to be an opt-out database instead of an opt-in. Opt-out 
means that if an individual does not want to be in the database then the individual has to 
opt-out by handing in a signed exclusion form. 
3.1.2 The Health Sector Database Act No. 139/1998 
The Health Sector Database Act was enacted in December 1998. The first chapter is 
about objective, scope, and term definitions. In Art. 2 it is mentioned that the database 
excludes bio-samples.  
The second chapter is about the operating license. The licensee, who will be the 
controller in the meaning of Art. 2(d) of the EU Data Protection Directive and a 
processor, is responsible for the cost of design, making, use, and all monitoring of the 
Health Sector Database. An operating license is to be given for a period of twelve years. 
Art. 6 is about a Monitoring Committee concerning the creation and operation of the 
Health Sector Database.  
Chapter three is about collection of information. Art. 7 is about employees of health 
institutions or self-employed health service workers, who would be processors in the 
meaning of art 2(e) of the EU Data Protection Directive. They are to prepare medical 
                                                 
29 Bill on a Health Sector Database , document no. 109, 1998. It says in the comments about Art. 8 that 
the first Bill did not have opt-out or opt-in options. Since the data was unidentifiable in the opinion of the 
legislator, explicit consent from the data subjects was believed to be unnecessary by reference to the EU 
Data Protection Directive. The legislator stated in the final Bill that later was enacted, that it decided to 
allow an opt-out option. 
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records for database entry and ensure that personal identification is in encrypted one-
way form. The Icelandic Data Protection Authority shall ensure that the encryption 
process and the data processing comply with necessary privacy standards and data 
protection. The licensee has the obligation to make working procedures that will fulfil 
the Data Protection Authority’s conditions about data subject’s privacy. In Art. 8 there 
is an opt-out possibility for the patients/data subjects.  
Chapter four is about access to the database for the Icelandic Health Ministry and 
Directorate of Health, which shall be free of charge, for making health reports, 
planning, policy-making, etc. Then there is one provision, Art. 10, about utilization of 
data, where the licensee is permitted by law to use the database for financial profit. It 
allows a merger of the database with databases such as of genetic and genealogic 
information. Art. 11 is about confidentiality of employees.  
Chapter five is about monitoring. It is the Icelandic Data Protection Authority that 
shall monitor processing of personal data and data protection in the design and later 
operation of the database. A special Monitoring Committee shall be established and it is 
responsible for monitoring all other issues, than mentioned above, in the design and 
later operation of the database. The Committee is for example to monitor all database 
queries and processing of data from the database and is to regularly send records to the 
Science Ethics Committee. Then there shall be established an Interdisciplinary Ethics 
Committee which shall assess studies carried out within the licensee’s company and 
inquiries which are received.  
Chapter six is about penalties and the revocation of the license. Finally chapter 
seven contains various provisions and provisional clauses. Regulation 32/2000 is based 
on the Act. It contains further information and rules on the Act’s provisions, mostly the 
separation of tasks between each supervising authority. 
3.2 The Decision in Short 
There has been one material judgment from the Supreme Court of Iceland about the 
Health Sector Database, case 151/2003,30 where the Supreme Court decided that Art. 
71(1) of the Icelandic Constitution had been violated. The provision states: “Everyone 
shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life.” 
                                                 
30 Icelandic Supreme Court (ISC), case 151/2003, p. 4153 – 4181. 
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3.2.1 Plaintiff’s Claims and Formal Authority 
A young woman sent a request to the Icelandic Health Directorate and asked that 
health information about her late father would not be registered in the Health Sector 
Database.31 When her request was denied, on the grounds that she had no authority to 
make this request for other people than herself, she filed a suit to get that decision 
invalidated. The District Court in Reykjavík agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff 
had no authority to make this request and dismissed the case on this lack of formality. 
The Supreme Court disagreed and said that the plaintiff did have personal interests at 
stake and should get a material judgment.32 
3.2.2 The Decision of the District Court 
The District Court now found that the plaintiff was a rightful party to the case. In 
Art. 3(6) of the Health Sector Database Act, health information is defined as 
“information on health of individuals, including genetic information.” Art. 10(1) gives 
permission of merging the Health Sector Database with a database of genealogical data 
and a database of genetic data. The Court held that the plaintiff had personal interests at 
stake since it was possible that information concerning her late father could result in 
implied conclusions about her and her private life.33 
The District Court stated on the issue of identifiability of data subjects that modern 
encryption methods were presumed so safe that in general it would be almost 
impossible to read encrypted information if the encryption code was kept secret.34 The 
Court stated there was no reason than to have faith that the Data Protection Authority 
could fulfil their legitimate purpose of securing the privacy of data subjects. The Court 
stated that, when assessing if information was identifiable, all possible preventions and 
safeguards to ensure the privacy of a person had to be considered. That was: The 
encryption of health information, access control, security claims and supervision by 
public authorities of the operation of the Health Sector Database, confidentiality of 
those who design and operate the database, and punishment and sanctions.35 Finally the 
                                                 
31 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4163. 
32 ISC, case 417/2001, p. 3962-3971. 
33 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4179. 
34 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4180. 
35 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4181. 
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District Court ruled that when all this had been taken into consideration and it was clear 
that identifiability of the data was not within reasonable expectations without 
considerable effort, then the data was unidentifiable in the sense of the law. The same 
applied for the possible merging of the database with databases of genetic and 
genealogic information. The Court did not think that the Act on the Health Sector 
Database went against Art. 71(1) of the Icelandic Constitution about protection of 
privacy, Art. 8 of the Convention, Art. 17 of the ICCPR or European Directives such as 
95/46/EC about Data Protection.36 
The Directorate/defendant was acquitted. 
3.2.3 The Decision of the Supreme Court 
The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The District Court, which had a specialist in computer science on board, concluded 
that one-way-encryption could be done in such a way that it would be almost 
impossible to read.37 The Supreme Court pointed out that the Act did not state which 
information from the medical records had to be encrypted in this way before being 
added to the Health Sector Database and if certain identifiable information in the 
medical records should be omitted. Regulation no. 32/200 about the Health Sector 
Database did not either give any clues on this matter. When looking at the operating 
license, it seemed that only the data subject’s ID numbers should be encrypted, but 
names and addresses were to be omitted.38 The Supreme Court went on stating that 
clearly this information was not the only information that could make a data subject 
identifiable. Other matters like age, the community where the data subject lives, marital 
status, education, employment, types of diseases, and other characteristics could alone 
or combined lead to the identifiability of the data subject.39 
The Supreme Court also mentioned that Art. 10 of the Health Sector Database Act 
neither specified what information from the database, which could be used for 
identification, would appear to those that sent queries to it nor did the Act give any 
clues as to what could be read into the information with the merging of the three 
                                                 
36 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4181. 
37 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4180. 
38 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4160. 
39 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4161. 
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databases. The regulation based on the Act did not have any specifications on the 
subject.40 In various provisions in the Act it was stated that the health information 
should be unidentifiable but the Act severely lacked information on how this should be 
ensured.41  
The Court emphasized the importance of Art. 71(1) of the Constitution for 
protection of people’s privacy and said that public monitoring authorities could not do 
their work sufficiently without having clear legal provisions to support their work. It 
was insufficient to only include steps for privacy protection in the operating license and 
working rules that could be changed at any time.42  
The Supreme Court found that the Health Sector Database Act did not ensure that 
the health information was in fact unidentifiable and thereby did not ensure the 
protection of the appellant’s privacy as it should, under Art. 71(1) of the Constitution.43 
The Court also referred to common practice of confidentiality about private life and the 
fact that the Act itself did not prohibit people to opt-out their passed away parents. The 
decision was in favour of the appellant and the Directorate of Health had to invalidate 
their decision of refusing the young woman’s request.44 
The reasoning of the Supreme Court is analysed further in chapter 5. 
                                                 
40 Regulation no. 32/200 about the Health Sector Database. 
41 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4161. 
42 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4161. 
43 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4161. 
44 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4162. 
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4 The German Census Act Decision (1983) 
4.1 Background Information 
4.1.1 Political Disagreement  
The Federal Government in Germany wanted a new census from the German nation 
in the beginning of the 1980’s. They needed statistics of “population count, the 
demographic and social structure of the population, and the economic condition of 
citizens generally.”45 The Census Act was accepted in both Houses of Parliament in 
1983. 
The Census Act was controversial and there was a great political debate in German 
society about the census46 because it was not just a population count but was also to 
gather a great amount of personal data such as “data related to job titles, employers and 
residences.”47 Additionally the Census Act permitted linking and data sharing between 
federal and local authorities.48 
4.1.2 The Census Act 198349 
Sections 1 to 8 of the Act listed in detail what kind of information citizens were 
obligated to give by the law. For example: Name, address, telephone number, sex, 
birthday, marital status, religion, nationality, what kind of accommodation, sources of 
                                                 
45 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 95. 
46 Riedel: New Bearings in German Data Protection, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 67. 
47 Jacoby: Redefining the Right to Be Let Alone: Privacy Rights and the Constitutionality of Technical 
Surveillance Measures in Germany and the United States, 2006, p. 32. 
48 Jacoby: Redefining the Right to Be Let Alone: Privacy Rights and the Constitutionality of Technical 
Surveillance Measures in Germany and the United States, 2006, p. 32. 
49 The author was not able to locate an English translation of the Census Act like was stated in section 1.2 
but has used a translation of the Census Decision by Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 112-
116, where the judges comment on the Act. 
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income, occupation, education, means of transport, time commuting, employment, 
working hours, status as patients or staff members of institutions, and much more.50 
Section 9 of the Act permitted a comparison of data from the 1983 Census  with the 
residence registry and the latter could be corrected if necessary. It also permitted 
anonymous data to be transmitted and shared with other authorities for statistics and 
community planning or for scientific purposes. 
Section 10 of the Act was about the information duty on the citizens. Section 11 had 
various provisions such as regarding statistical secrecy and the duty of early erasure.51 
4.2 The Census Act Decision in Short 
4.2.1 The Claims of the Complainants 
The complainants had gotten an injunction which suspended the execution of the 
census.52 The complainants claimed the Census Act violated several basic rights like 
the rule of law principle53 (no. rettssikkerhet, de. Rechtsstaatsprinzip), the norm-clarity 
and precision principle, and because statistics and administrative actions were 
combined. They also based their case on the statement that “re-identification of 
personality-related data under modern conditions of data processing poses no 
difficulty”54 and that wide and obscure terms in the Census Act could lead to 
unconstitutional use of data amongst other things. 
                                                
4.2.2 The Government’s Defence 
The Federal Government along with some Länder’s Governments,55 hereby called 
the defendant, claimed amongst other things that the Census Act of 1983 was 
constitutional and serving statistical purposes. It guaranteed that data collection, 
 
50 Riedel: FCC,K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 95. 
51 Riedel: FCC,K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 96. 
52 Injunction by the Federal Constitutional Court from April 13th, 1983, 1 BvR 209, 
53 The rule of law principle involves that governmental and/or public authority can only take their 
decisions and use their power in accordance with written and published statutes. 
54 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 96. 
55 Germany has had a federal system since 1949 and has a Federal Parliament and Federal Constitutional 
Court. The country is divided into 16 Länder that each have its own Government and Parliament. Further 
information can be found in Gunlicks: The Länder and German Federalism, 2003. 
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storage, and transmission were anonymous.56 The defendant claimed that the legislator 
had a margin of appreciation and the Census Act did not violate the basic principles the 
complainants claimed. 
4.2.3 The Court’s Decision 
The Court went through all the claims of the complainants and decided that many 
of the claimed violations were in fact not unconstitutional. For example it was found 
legitimate to ask for information about the citizen’s religion and such a question did not 
violate the fundamental right of freedom of religious belief. 
The Court did find the provisions of Sec. 9(1) – (3) of the Census Act 
unconstitutional and void. It violated Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) of the Basic 
Law (de. Grundgesetz –GG). Art. 2(1) states: “Every person shall have the right to free 
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or 
offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”57 Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law 
states “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of 
all state authority.”58 
The Court concluded that the general right to the free development of one’s own 
personlity or general personality right (de. allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) led to 
individual self-determination on deciding when actions were to be taken or to be 
omitted in the informational aspect. In other words, the right to decide for oneself when 
and within what limits personal information and facts should be disclosed to others, i.e. 
informational self-determination (de. Informationelle Selbstbestimmung).59 
The Court limited its discussion of the right to informational self-determination to 
the applicability and possible utilization of the personal data the Census Act required 
the German population to give. In that connection the Court examined the purpose of 
the Act and the possible processing by information technology. The Court stated: 
“Thereby a particular datum, insignificant on its own, may assume a new order of 
                                                 
56 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 97. 
57 Translation from the German Basic Law Art. 2(1). 
58 Translation from the German Basic Law Art. 1(1). 
59 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 100. 
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magnitude; under conditions of automatic data-processing, ‘insignificant’ data thus no 
longer exist.”60 
The Court mentioned that data collection and processing for statistical purposes 
was very important for state policy and planning and could not be too narrowly defined. 
On the other hand, limitations had to be specified within the given information 
system.61 The Court went on and said: “...censuses tend to carry with them the inherent 
danger of personality-hostile registration and cataloguing of individuals...” and 
therefore the Court stated there was a need for special provisions to protect the general 
personality right of those who were obligated to participate in the census, the data 
subjects.62 
The Court said that the legislator should consider if the aims of the census, in some 
circumstances, could be met if the data subjects were anonymous and their identity not 
traceable. Then it took an example that a warden at a mental hospital could give the 
necessary statistical information about the patients without identifying them. 
It stated that only when suitable safeguards were in place should public authorities 
be allowed access to the data for the objective of planning.63 
The Court found that the comparing of the Census to the existing residents registry 
for correction of the latter in Sec. 9(1) was unconstitutional since it infringed the right 
to informational self-determination. It found the provision too obscure in content since 
it was not only for statistical objectives but for administrative action, which was without 
any purpose limitation.64 
The Court found that the transmission allowed to other public authorities in Sec. 
9(2) also infringed the right to informational self-determination because of obscurity. 
The provision did not state a clear objective with the transmission and without that, it 
was hard to predict if the transmission was within the objective’s limitations.65 
The Court found the permission for local authorities to use anonymous personal 
data for regional planning etc. in Sec. 9(3)1 infringed the right to informational self-
                                                 
60 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 102. 
61 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 103. 
62 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 104. 
63 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 104. 
64 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 112. 
65 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 113. 
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determination because of obscurity. The provision did neither state clearly if the 
personality-related data could also be used for administrative execution, nor did it 
define clear objectives. Infringement of the right to informational self-determination 
was also violated with Sec. 9(3)2 of the Census Act. This provision limited local 
authorities’ use of personality-related data to “statistical processing.” This expression 
was found to be too obscure and imprecise also when considering that local authorities 
usually have additional knowledge that could easily lead to identifiability for 
individuals.66  
The transmission of data for scientific purposes to persons in civil service allowed 
in Sec. 9(4) of the Census Act was on the other hand found to be constitutional. The 
provision was clear on limitations, names and addresses were to be omitted from the 
transmission and the objective was specific enough.67 
                                                 
66 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 114. 
67 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 115. 
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5 Comparison of the Health Sector Database and Census Act Decisions 
5.1 Comparison of Formality 
There is a major formality difference in the two cases. The Icelandic case was a 
private suit, one plaintiff seeking the annulment of the Directorate’s decision regarding 
her affairs. Nevertheless the Court’s decision could be relevant for other cases.  
The complainants in Germany on the other hand could file a suit directly to the 
Constitutional Court claiming the Census Act unconstitutional. They did not have to 
“wait for executive action in subsequent legal redress based upon that statute.”68 The 
Constitutional Court had the power to nullify provisions that were found to be 
unconstitutional. 
5.2 Political Controversy of the Acts 
The Census decision was bold at the time. The Federal Government of Germany 
had spent vast amount of time and finances preparing to carry out the 1983 census.69 
The nation was divided. Many citizens found the census too privacy intrusive but others 
did not mind assisting the government and public agencies in their collection for 
statistics.  
The Health Sector Database decision was also bold. Vast amount of time and 
finances had been put into the design of the database and preparation for its operation. 
The nation was also divided in their opinion. Many citizens found the idea of collecting 
a whole nation’s medical records in a centralized database, operated by a private 
company for financial profit, controversial. Others were happy to contribute to scientific 
research that would be advantageous for mankind. The different conclusions of the 
District Court and the Supreme Court show very well the controversy of the Act.  
The criticism of the Health Sector Database Act in the decision had in effect similar 
impact as in the German decision. The projects became postponed, at least for a while, 
                                                 
68 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 98. 
69 Riedel: New Bearings in German Data Protection, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 68. 
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because the legal foundation was not solid. The postponement lasted a few years in 
Germany until a new and improved Census Act was accepted by the parliament in 
1987.70  
The Icelandic Supreme Court’s decision came as the final blow and the Health 
Sector Database never left the designing board. 
5.3 The Time Factor 
The timing of the decisions also deserves consideration. The Census decision was 
made in 1983 or a number of years before the enormous impact of the Internet. The 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany showed precaution and acknowledged 
possible use and misuse of collected data in the future, especially regarding data 
transmission to other agencies. The Court emphasized that informational self-
determination needed protection because of present and future automatic data 
processing.71  
The Health Sector Database decision was made twenty years later when nearly 
every business and home in Western-Europe had gained Internet access. The possible 
threats of data collection, transmission, merging, and linking were no longer in the far-
fetched future but were real and in the present.  
5.4 Decisions Based on National Constitutional Rights Only 
Both Courts found a breach of fundamental rights protected by their country’s 
constitution. The Icelandic Supreme Court only relied on and referred to the Icelandic 
Constitution but the District Court mentioned Art. 8 of the Convention, Art. 17 of the 
ICCPR and the EU Data Protection Directive. Neither the Icelandic nor the German 
Courts referred to the national Data Protection Act.72 The German Federal 
Constitutional Court also relied only on the German Basic Law.  
                                                 
70 Schwartz: The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of 
Informational Self-Determination, 1989, p. 700. 
71 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 100. 
72 Icelandic Data Protection Act no. 77/2000 and the Federal Data Protection Act in Germany from 
November 15, 2006. 
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The Health Sector Database decision has been criticized for not solving the case 
with reference to relevant European instruments.73 It seems to the author that, the 
Icelandic Court did not feel it was necessary to refer to international instruments since 
Art. 71(1) of the Constitution applied to the violation at hand. The author thinks it 
would only have strengthened the Court’s decision if it had referred to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany 
also relied only on national instruments but one has to keep in mind that in 1983 
information privacy case law from Strasbourg was not developed as it is today. 
5.5  Importance of Correct Information 
Another difference between the two cases was how and from whom the personal 
data was collected. Like has been said before, the Census Act laid upon the German 
citizens information duty. Everyone had to fill out a detailed questionnaire and was 
obligated to give correct answers.74 The Federal Constitutional Court weighed the 
possibility of data subjects deliberately giving wrong answers, which could be 
destructive for statistics and the common good of society (de. Gemeinwohl). The Court 
concluded that obscure purpose provisions especially about future use of the 
information could make that possibility more likely.75  
The European Court of Human Rights addressed the importance of information 
privacy in context to the common good of society in Z v. Finland:76 “It is crucial not 
only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or her 
confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general. Without such 
protection, those in need of medical assistance may be deterred from revealing such 
information of a personal and intimate nature as may be necessary in order to receive 
appropriate treatment and, even, from seeking such assistance, thereby endangering 
their own health and, in the case of transmissible diseases, that of the community.” 
In the case of the Icelandic Health Sector Database, personal information was to be 
collected from health institutions and self-employed health workers and not directly 
                                                 
73 Gertz: An analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court judgement on the Health Sector Database Act, 2004, 
sections 5.2 and 5.4 
74 Riedel: FCC, K,HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 108. 
75 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 105. 
76 Z v. Finland, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R, para. 95. 
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from data subjects. There was greater separation between the data subjects and the 
database than in the Census case. The data subjects in Iceland were more likely from 
the beginning to give correct information because the personal data was being collected 
in relation with the data subject’s personal health. Also because there was an opt-out 
option in the Health Sector Database Act, data subjects could take advantage of it and 
did not need to withhold information in fear of their data being used in the Health 
Sector Database. Some people still had doubt, because in fact the whole nation’s health 
data was to be collected. Data for subjects that had opted-out were then to be removed 
before the data subjects became unidentifiable.  
5.6 Legitimate Access to the Data 
The legitimate access was different in the two cases. The Census Act only allowed 
access of government and public authorities. The legislator had accepted the Census Act 
for the purposes of collecting data for governmental and regional statistics and 
planning. The personal data was not intended to be disclosed to private companies and 
the census was not intended to give financial profit. The census was being paid for by 
federal funds.77 
In Iceland, however, the Health Sector Database Act is first and foremost giving a 
private company a licence to collect and process personal data. The licensee is 
permitted by Art. 10(4) to use the Health Sector Database for purposes of financial 
profit, under conditions laid down in the legislation and the licence. Although Art. 9 of 
the Health Sector Database Act does ensure the Ministry of Health and the national 
Directorate of Health access to statistical data for purposes such as policy-making and 
planning. This access is to be free of charge and is an example of conditions that has to 
be fulfilled to get and to keep the licence. The making, operation, and monitoring of the 
Health Sector Database is to be paid for by the licensee according to Art. 4 of the Act. 
Has this difference possibly had any effect on the two decisions? The Federal 
Constitutional Court found it necessary to have clear provisions on content and to have 
purpose limitations so the government and public agencies had strict guidance to 
follow.  
                                                 
77 Riedel: New Bearing in German Data Protection, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 74. 
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There is no reason why data subjects would need less protection of their right to 
privacy and their right to informational self-determination because the data controller 
and data processor, is a private firm instead of a public authority, as was the case in the 
Health Sector Database decision. In the author’s view, data subjects would perhaps 
need even more protection than if the data controller and/or data processor were purely 
governmental. The reason for this is that it can be even harder to monitor and supervise 
the actions of private parties. One reason that contributes to this difference is the 
concept of freedom of information. Many countries around the world have implemented 
an Act on freedom of information which gives public access to governmental records.78 
A Freedom of Information Act puts pressure on governmental and public bodies to 
comply with the rule of law at all times. Of course the Data Protection Authority and 
possibly other monitoring bodies are to monitor and inspect all data controllers and data 
processors alike, from public and/or private market.  
5.7 Differentiation of Purpose for Collected Data 
The Federal Constitutional Court emphasized the differentiation of data collection 
for the purpose of statistics versus administrative action. The Court stated that statistics 
were of great value for state policies and planning and therefore data collected for those 
purposes could not be too narrow or limited. On the other hand because of difficulty 
assessing in advance the possible utilization and linkage it was necessary to define 
unambiguously the processing conditions within the information system.79 Because of 
the danger of cataloguing of data subjects that were obligated to take part in the census, 
data collection and processing for statistical purposes needed special provisions 
protecting the general personality right and the right to informational self-determination 
of the data subjects.80 In the opinion of the Court, the legislator had to investigate if 
there were ways of meeting the objective of the census while securing unidentifiability 
of the data subjects.81 Personal data was identifiable at least at the time of the collection 
                                                 
78 A German Freedom of Information Act was enacted on January 1, 2006. An Icelandic Freedom of 
Information Act no. 50/1996 was enacted on January 1, 1997. For more information see 
www.freedominfo.org 
79 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 103. 
80 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 104. 
81 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 104. 
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and maybe longer. The Court found suitable safeguards were especially essential with 
statistical censuses and data had to be made anonymous as soon as possible. Data 
subjects could not be expected to obey the information duty without suitable 
safeguards.82 
The Federal Constitutional Court said that it would infringe the right to 
informational self-determination if the personal data collected for statistical purposes by 
law would be identifiable when transmitted and used for administrative action.83 The 
Court then went on and stated that different conditions and/or emphasis were of concern 
when collecting data for statistical purposes versus administrative purposes. Thereby, a 
statute trying to combine both purposes was unsuitable and unconstitutional. It would 
lead to obscurity of the norm and involve disproportionality.84 
In this respect the Health Sector Database decision had similar issues at hand. The 
Health Sector Database Act was meant to include data collection for the purpose of 
statistics on the one hand and scientific research on the other. Even though the latter 
was not administrative action it was a totally different purpose that presumably needed 
different conditions and/or emphasis to be fulfilled. More procedural mechanisms were 
needed in the Act to safeguard the right to privacy of the data subjects, in the opinion of 
the Supreme Court. The merger of the Health Sector Database that was mentioned in 
Art. 10(2) of the Health Sector Database Act probably influenced what the Supreme 
Court felt were too obscure purpose provisions which directly led to the infringement of 
privacy as protected by Art. 71 of the Icelandic Constitution. 
5.8 The Value of On-line Data Access 
The Icelandic Supreme Court advised that legislation should not entail a real risk of 
unauthorized access to personal information, either to public or private parties.85 It is 
interesting that the Court made such a statement without actually going into any depth 
of the matter. The Court did not answer the question of what is a real risk of 
unauthorized access. 
                                                 
82 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 104. The concept of suitable safeguards will be 
discussed further in section 5.12.3. 
83 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 110. 
84 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 111. 
85 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4160. 
 24
In this context it is of relevance to look at Art. 10(4) of the Health Sector Database 
Act where it says: “The health service database may not be transported out of Iceland, 
and processing of it may only be carried out here in Iceland.” Art. 10(3) of the Health 
Sector Database Act, says: “The licensee may not grant direct access to data in the 
database.” By reading these provisions, one is inclined to presume that the legislator did 
not have in mind that the Health Sector Database would be accessible on the Internet. 
Despite this, the licensee did ask the Icelandic Data Protection Authority for permission 
of on-line access to the Health Sector Database, later in the designing stage. The first 
draft of the Bill mentioned the possibility of on-line access to the database.86 This 
provision was then abandoned in the final version of the Bill. When questioned by the 
Data Protection Authority, the Icelandic Health Ministry answered that they did not feel 
the omission of this clause by the Parliament was an indicator that on-line access was to 
be forbidden.87 Then the legislator would have made a clear prohibition on on-line 
access. The Health Ministry also stated that in their opinion, the provision in article 
10(3) where direct access is prohibited, did not cover on-line access. Finally the 
Ministry concluded that it was up to the Data Protection Authority to decide if the 
design and procedures complied with the law.88 This debate was public and covered by 
the Icelandic press and took place the year before the Supreme Court heard the case. 
It is possible that the debate on on-line access of the Health Sector Database had 
effect on the Icelandic Supreme Court’s assessment on what was a real risk. Especially 
because the Health Sector Database Act permitted merging of the Health Sector 
Database with a database of genealogical data and a database of genetic data in Art. 10 
of the Act. The impact and value of accessibility of data on the Internet should not be 
underestimated. It makes data retrievable all over the world in seconds and it makes 
transmission, merging, and linking of data very easy compared to manually collected 
and stored data. Not to mention possible higher risk of unauthorized access, including 
hacking.  
The permitted merger results in less predictability of future use of the data. Obscure 
purpose provisions can infringe the right of informational self-determination, like the 
                                                 
86 Annual Report 2002, The Icelandic Data Protection Authority, section 3.2.3. 
87 Annual Report 2002, The Icelandic Data Protection Authority, section 3.2.4. 
88 Annual Report 2002, The Icelandic Data Protection Authority, section 3.2.4. 
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Census decision showed. Even though there was no debate on on-line access when the 
Census decision was made the Federal Court showed great deal of precaution and 
considered possible future threats of automatic processing of data. Transmission of data 
to other agencies needed clear purpose provisions and could not be unlimited. These 
precautionary measures were taken at a time when on-line data accessing was not even 
an issue. 
5.9 A Right to Refuse Participation 
The Census Act Section 5 obligated German citizens to participate in the census.89 
They had to give their personal information or else face punitive sanctions. There was 
no permission to opt-out. One of the many reasons the census was being done was to 
register how many voting adults were in each of the Länder.90 This reason alone gives 
clarification on why opting-out was not a possibility.  
An obligation to participate in a census is an infringement of the right of 
informational self-determination. The Federal Constitutional Court, on the other hand, 
found it justifiable and proportionate to the public interests at stake. One can wonder if 
the lack of an opt-out option for the data subjects had an effect on this decision and if 
that should lead to a stricter protection. In the author’s opinion it should not matter if 
the personal data was given because of pure obligation, with the free will of those 
opting-in, or the passivity of those not opting-out. Fundamental rights of the data 
subjects should always get equal protection. 
In the case of the Health Sector Database things were different. In the first Bill all 
Icelanders, living or deceased, were obligated by law to participate in the database.91 
The Act on the other hand did permit opting-out of the database.92 
The author doubts that the first draft, without a right to refuse participation, would 
have been found constitutional. Because even though governmental bodies were to get 
access to the database for the purpose of statistics and planning, the main function of 
the Health Sector Database was to be a research tool in the hands of a private company. 
The licensee bore financial responsibility and was allowed to gain financial profit from 
                                                 
89 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 106. 
90 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 95. 
91 Cf. Bill on a Health Sector Database, document no. 109, 1998, comment on Art. 8. 
92 Health Sector Database Act, Art. 8. 
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the database. There were no reasons of immediate public interests at stake, such as in 
the Census case, that could justify such an infringement of the right to informational 
self-determination. In the author’s view that would have failed the balancing test. 
 
Why was there only an opt-out possibility for the data subjects in the Health Sector 
Database Act and not a provision about opting-in to the database? The case of the 
Health Sector Database involved almost exclusively health information. Art. 8(1) of the 
EU Data Protection Directive basically forbids processing on various sensitive 
information such as health information. Then Art. 8(2) covers exceptions to this rule. 
Art. 8(2)a specifies that the data subject has to give explicit consent for processing of 
health information. Is the passivity of those that do not take action by opting-out of the 
database “explicit consent” enough to be regarded as fulfilling the conditions of Art. 
8(2)a? This is an issue that the Icelandic Supreme Court did not address in its decision 
on the Health Sector Database but is relevant to the question of informational self-
determination.93  
Consent is very much related to a right to informational self-determination. The 
definition of consent and what is to be interpreted as consent is therefore of relevance. 
This issue was addressed in a recent working document from the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, about personal data processing in electronic health records 
(EHR). Unfortunately the discussion was rather ambiguous. First they state: “...consent 
in the case of sensitive personal data and therefore in an EHR must be explicit. Opt-out 
solutions will not meet the requirement of being ‘explicit’.”94 Then in a chapter about 
respecting self-determination they say: “The functionality of ‘agreeing’ in the context of 
suitable safeguards is different from ‘consent’ under Article 8(2) of the Directive and 
therefore needs not meet with all requirements of Article 8(2): e.g. whereas consent as 
a legal basis for processing health data would always have to be ‘explicit’ according to 
Article 8(2), agreement as a safeguard need not necessarily be given in form of an 
opt-in – the possibility to express self-determination could – depending on the situation 
                                                 
93 Cf. Discussion on the issue of consent in Gertz: An Analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court Judgment 
on the Health Sector Database, 2004, sections 4.2. and 5.1. 
94 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Working document on the processing of personal data 
relating to health in electronic records (EHR), 2007, p. 9. 
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– also be offered in form of an opt-out/ a right to refuse.”95 Then the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party continues by suggesting that it should be a rule, in an Act 
covering EHR system, that the data would be “governed by an incremental system of 
‘opt-in’ requirements (especially when processing data, which are potentially extra 
harmful such as psychiatric data, data about abortion, etc.) and ‘opt-out’ possibilities for 
less intrusive data.”96 
The guidance given by Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is not as clear as 
one had hoped and in the author’s view rather contradictory. Many questions are left 
unanswered such as: How will such filtering be done of “extra harmful” versus “less 
intrusive” data and who will supervise it?  
5.10 Informational Self-Determination in the Census Act Decision 
The Federal Constitutional Court discussed how the possibilities in automatic data 
processing could give new meaning to data that before might have been insignificant on 
its own but when linked with other data collections could give a partial or a complete 
personality profile (de. Persönlichkeitsbild).97 If the data subject did not know what 
data was stored about him/her, when and how it would be used, and by whom, it 
affected his/her right to decide freely and without pressure which information to give. 
This would be where self-determination comes in. The Court found it was “...a 
prerequisite of free development of the personality under modern conditions of data 
processing, the individual needs protection against unlimited collection, storage, 
application and transmission of his personal data.”98 
                                                
It is interesting in this respect to look at the role the German Federal 
Constitutional Court is taking. The Court seems to feel it is necessary to protect 
individuals in this fast-evolving computer age where there is no way of knowing how 
conditions of data processing will develop. Here the emphasis should be on the word 
unlimited. The Court found a need for limiting personal data processing by demanding 
 
95 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Working document on the processing of personal data 
relating to health in electronic records (EHR), 20007, p. 13-14. 
96 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Working document on the processing of personal data 
relating to health in electronic records (EHR), 20007, p. 14. 
97 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 100. 
98 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 101. 
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unambiguous provisions, clear purpose, and suitable safeguards. The Court was 
basically using the “in accordance with the law” criterion of the European Court of 
Human Rights, that is explained further in section 5.12.4. 
5.10.1 Limitations on the Right of Informational Self-Determination 
The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the right to informational self-
determination was not without limitations because it needed to be in balance with 
important public interests.99 Those interests could be for example necessary statistics 
for planning purposes such as health care, transportation, education system, national 
economy, or anything that serves the public common good. According to the Court all 
limitations had to be in accordance with basic principles such as the rule of law, of 
clarity and proportionality.100 
The private interests of the individual for his/her right to informational self-
determination are weighed against public interests to find out which are the 
predominant interests in each case. Even though public interests are found to prevail, 
certain measures must be taken to keep the infringement of the general personality right 
and the right to informational self-determination to its minimum or in proportion with 
the interests at stake. Therefore the legislator has a duty to implement procedural and 
material safeguards like the Census Act decision showed.101 The concept of suitable 
safeguards will be addressed in more detail in section 5.12.3. 
This balancing test the Federal Constitutional Court refers to is in fact very 
similar to the balancing test which is found in Art. 8(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.102 The rights that Art. 8(1) of the Convention ensures can only be 
interfered with if these conditions are fulfilled: a) in accordance with the law, b) 
necessary in a democratic society and c) one or more certain important public interests 
that are listed in the Article are in place, such as public safety and prevention of crime. 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg always uses this balancing test to 
                                                 
99 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No. 1, 1984, p. 101. 
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search for justification, when applying Art. 8 in their cases.103 When evaluating what is 
necessary in a democratic society, the Court in Strasbourg relies on the principle of 
proportionality.104 The Strasbourg Court examines if there has been “a pressing social 
need” and if the interference has been “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” for 
an interference to be found justifiable by Art. 8(2) of the Convention.105 
5.11 Informational Self-Determination in the Health Sector Database Decision 
The Supreme Court, in the Health Sector Database decision, relies solely on Art. 
71(1) of the Icelandic Constitution, which is very similar to Art. 8(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights beside the special reference to correspondence, which is 
in Art. 71(2).106 The Supreme Court did not directly refer to a violation of a right to 
informational self-determination.  
Extensive amounts of information concerning patients’ private life are gathered in 
most medical records. Some of the information is sensitive data in the meaning of Art. 
8(1) of the EU Data Protection Directive.107 The Icelandic Supreme Court gave general 
advice to the legislator to be careful that statutes would not result in a real risk of such 
information getting into the hands of irrelevant third parties.108 This would be a referral 
to the necessity of suitable safeguards as in Art. 8(4) of Data Protection Directive.109  
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108 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4160. 
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The Supreme Court stated that the legislator had to ensure, as much as possible, 
that the information was unidentifiable.110 In the Census Act decision suitable 
safeguards, such as ensuring unidentifiability were mentioned as a prerequisite of the 
right to informational self-determination.111  
In the opinion of the Icelandic Supreme Court, the Health Sector Database Act was 
obscure on the suitable safeguards the state was obligated to provide the data subjects. 
The Icelandic Supreme Court emphasized that unidentifiability of the data subjects was 
not ensured in regards to automatic processing and linking that were authorized in Art. 
10(2) of the Health Sector Database Act by permitting the merger of the three 
databases.112  
 
The author presumes the Court could have drawn from this provision a separate 
right of informational self-determination on the same grounds as the Federal 
Constitutional Court did. It depends on the definition of privacy used. Informational 
self-determination should fall within the concept of privacy as for example Westin 
defined it,113 just as free development of one’s personality and respect for human 
dignity falls within the concept of private life as the European Court of Human Rights 
interprets Art. 8 of the Convention.114 It seems as one of the Icelandic Supreme Court’s 
main arguments was that the data subjects could not be sure that their health data was in 
fact not traceable to them and what the merger of the Health Sector Database with the 
two other databases could inflict on their interests. The Supreme Court did not go into 
the meaning of this for the data subjects in relation to what kind of consent was 
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necessary.115 Perhaps the Court did not feel that was necessary since the Court 
concluded it was a breach of the constitutional right to privacy. In the author’s view, the 
risk factor of identifiability could have influenced the citizens’ chances of taking a well 
founded decision when deciding to opt-out or allowing their data to be registered into 
the Health Sector Database. The fear of identification could even have influenced what 
patients revealed to their doctors knowing that the information would end in the Health 
Sector Database. These are also undesirable results for society as a whole, because of 
increased risk of inaccurate statistics and/or danger to common health for example if a 
data subject keeps a serious contagious disease a secret. A risk of identifiability is 
closely connected to informational self-determination. 
5.11.1 Expanded Right to Informational Self-Determination 
It seems that the Health Sector Database decision may have expanded the right to 
informational self-determination in an interesting and a controversial way. An 
individual can use it not only for the protection of his own personal data but also 
personal data of his/her close relatives. The Icelandic Supreme Court mentioned it 
specifically as an argument that the Health Sector Database Act did not prohibit in so 
many words that people could opt-out their passed away parents.116 The Court thereby 
overlooked what was stated in the preparatory work by the legislator, that opting-out 
close deceased relatives was not presumed an option.117 Health data of deceased 
citizens were anticipated to be stored in the database. 
                                                
 The author presumes what was of relevance in this particular case was the factor of 
unpredictability for the data subjects with regards to the merging of the Health Sector 
Database with the databases of genetic information and of genealogical information. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the Act did not ensure the necessary suitable 
safeguards.118 Iceland has a small population of about 300.000119 and almost everyone 
is related depending on how far back one looks in the family-trees. The genealogical 
database consists of all Icelanders living and deceased that have been registered in 
 
115 See discussion on consent in section 5.9. 
116 ISC, case 151/2007, p. 4162. 
117 Cf. Bill on a Health Sector Database, document no. 109, 1998, comment on Art. 8. 
118 ISC, case 151/2007, p. 4160. 
119 Cf. http://www.iceland.is 
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church books and public records many centuries back. The database of genetic 
information consists of bio-samples that about 65% of adult Icelanders have donated for 
research, with informed consent.120 By the merge of these three databases, in a small 
society like Iceland, it is a likely reasonable possibility, that even if you opt-out of the 
Health Sector Database, you might be identifiable as the only “one missing” in the 
family tree and some conclusions might be drawn about you such as odds of genetic 
diseases that run in your family. At least that seems to be the conclusion of the Icelandic 
Supreme Court. The Article 29 Data Protection Working party has said in relation to 
genetic data: “In this context, questions arise as to whether or not genetic data belong 
exclusively to the single, specific individual from whom they are collected, and to 
whether family members have the right to access to such data even in the absence of the 
individual’s consent.” The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party suggested that the 
issued needed to be resolved on a case by case basis, weighing all interests.121 
The plaintiff in the Health Sector Database decision wanted to opt-out her late 
father because of such concerns. The risk of this being possible is the same, for the data 
subject that wants to opt-out, that has all of his/her close relatives alive or if one or all 
are deceased. It is a statement of this thesis that this is truly an expansion of the 
individual’s right to informational self-determination. Gertz has criticised this as an 
undesirable result by the Icelandic Supreme Court.122 Gertz asked if Icelanders are so 
genetically homogenous as proclaimed then should not the same legal standing be given 
to every Icelander? Gertz rightly points out, the reasoning of the Court leads to the 
question if every Icelander can then sue and demand that their living close relatives 
would opt-out of the Health Sector Database. The Supreme Court did not answer this 
question but the author presumes it is because of the individual’s own right to 
informational self-determination that those living relatives can decide for themselves if 
they want to opt-out or not. It would be a personal decision protected by Art. 71(1) of 
the Icelandic Constitution. Although the results remain that a data subject that has 
opted-out, when his/her living close relatives have not, is more vulnerable than the data 
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subject that has opted-out and used his/her expanded right of informational self-
determination to opt-out his/hers deceased close relatives as well. 
  It seems that the main reason was to find a legal justification for giving the 
plaintiff a formal status as a rightful party to filing the suit without much thought to the 
meaning of this reach of a person’s right to informational self-determination to the 
informational sphere of other individuals. It is uncertain if the Icelandic Supreme Court 
was intentionally expanding a right to informational self-determination but the decision 
leads to the conclusion that the death of an individual’s close relative does seem to give 
the individual expanded private interests in the relative’s health information. 
5.12 Further Analysis of the Right to Informational Self-Determination 
5.12.1 Reasonable Expectations of Data Subjects 
The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany concluded that a few provisions in 
the Census Act were lacking objectives and were obscure of content. This infringed the 
data subjects’ right to informational self-determination and was found 
unconstitutional.123 Materially this was regarding unclear boundaries between statistics 
and administrative execution and transmission permission to other public authorities 
and their utilization of the data.124 The state had to make sure that the use of the 
personal data collected for the census was at least within reasonable expectations of the 
data subjects. The nature of those expectations depends on clear objectives and 
limitations. Section 5 of the Census Act laid an information duty on the data subjects 
but the Court pointed out that without the state’s assurance of suitable safeguards, such 
as unidentifiability, the data subjects would not be prepared to give truthful 
statements.125 If it was unclear for what purpose the personal data would be used and to 
what authorities personal data could be transmitted, then the data subjects would not 
trust the census and perhaps give incorrect answers. 
In the case of the Health Sector Database decision the District Court referred to a 
reasonable expectations test and concluded that the data subjects had reasonable 
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expectations of unidentifiability in the sense of the law, since it was the assessment of 
the Court that the health data could not be traced to certain individuals at least without 
considerable efforts.126 The Supreme Court still assessed there was a risk of 
unauthorised access and the data subjects could not be sure of unidentifiability since 
suitable safeguards were not in place.127 
The reasonable expectations of data subjects in context to their privacy are always 
a matter of an assessment in each case.128 Guidelines and precedence can be found in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Strasbourg 
Court seems first to have used the reasonable expectations test for assessing privacy in 
the case Halford v. United Kingdom from 1997.129 The case Peck v. United Kingdom 
concerned personal data processing without the consent of the data subject.130 The 
Strasbourg Court concluded that Peck could claim a partial expectation of privacy even 
though he could not reasonably expect absolute privacy. A recent case is von Hannover 
v. Germany where the reasonable expectations test seems to have gotten to a stage that 
it was applied without much explanation. The Strasbourg Court concluded that the 
photos of von Hannover in her daily life fell within the scope of Art. 8 of the 
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Convention and she should have had a “legitimate expectation of protection of her 
private life.”131 
5.12.2 Data and Identifiability 
The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the unpredictable future use of the 
collected data was a violation of the general personality right and an “informational 
infringement.”132 However, citizens had to accept this since public interests, statistics 
for planning purposes etc., outweighed the private interests.133 
The Court emphasized that collecting personal data for the purpose of statistics and 
even transmitting it to other authorities was per se not unconstitutional if the data was 
unidentifiable. The requirement was to remove data subject’s identity as soon as 
possible.134  
Similar applied to the Health Sector Database decision. The Supreme Court 
emphasized that the legislator had to address how unidentifiability was to be ensured in 
the Act itself and not left to be decided later. It was insufficient to give the licensee 
leeway to develop rules on confidentiality even though the Data Protection Authority 
should supervise the work.135 In Art. 10(2) of the Health Sector Database it says: “The 
licensee shall develop methods and protocols that meet the requirements of the Data 
Protection Commission in order to ensure confidentiality in connecting data from the 
Health Sector Database, from a database of genealogical data, and from a database of 
genetic data.” The Court pointed that the Act and regulation did not give any more 
guidance as to what should be included and how the queries should be processed from 
the merger of the three databases,136 apart from the final sentence in Art. 10(2) where it 
says: “It is not permissible to give information on individuals, and this shall be ensured 
e.g. by limitation of access.” 
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It can be said with good reasoning that the lack of clear objectives, predictability 
and safeguards in the Act to ensure unidentifiability, was an infringement of the data 
subject’s right to informational self-determination, just like in the Census decision. The 
Court was in fact using the “in accordance with the law” criterion of the European 
Court of Human Rights, that will be elaborated in chapter 5.12.4. 
 Gertz made a valid and an interesting point that the Supreme Court did not touch 
upon the question whether a decoding key existed of the supposedly unidentifiable data 
in the Health Sector Database.137 Gertz pointed out that if it did exist, it would mean 
that the Health Sector Database would be in violation with the Health Sector Database 
Act itself and the EU Data Protection Directive, which Iceland must adhere to as a 
member of EEA. The Court’s conclusion was only based on violation of Art. 71(1) of 
the Constitution. If sensitive health data is not ensured unidentifiability, explicit consent 
is required according to Art. 8 of the Data Protection Directive. This issue should have 
been addressed  in the Court’s discussion.  
In this context, take note of Art. 8(1) of the Health Sector Database Act where it 
states: “A patient may request at any time that information on him/her not be entered 
onto the health-sector database. The patient's request may apply to all existing 
information on him/her or that which may be recorded in the future, or to some specific 
information.” This basically means that existing data in the Health Sector Database 
partially or in whole is to be retrievable by law if and when the data subject wishes. One 
can ask how that could be done without an existence of a decoding key, making all data 
subjects identifiable. It seems like a contradiction in the terms of the Health Sector 
Database Act since in Art. 7(2) it says: “Personal identification shall be coded one-way, 
i.e. by coding that cannot be traced using a decoding key.” 
5.12.2.1 Definition of Identifiability 
From the discussion above it is clear that definition of identifiability is of utmost 
importance in both decisions. Art. 2(a) of the EU Data Protection Directive says: “An 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
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physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” The same definition is 
used in Art. 3(2) of the Health Sector Database Act. 
The defendants in both the Census case and the Health Sector Database case 
claimed the relevant Acts guaranteed anonymity and unidentifiability of data subjects. 
In both cases the Courts decided that the legislators had not taken suitable safeguards to 
ensure unidentifiability. In the Health Sector Database decision it said that only 
changing ID-numbers for a pseudonym and omit names and addresses was insufficient 
because so much other personal data could be indirectly identifying. Especially when 
taking into consideration the permission of merging the Health Sector Database with a 
database of genealogical data, which has the name, ID number, address of every 
Icelander and how they are related, and with a database of genetic data, which includes 
blood samples and DNA of a large part of the Icelandic population.  
5.12.2.2 How to Determine Identifiability 
Recital 26 of the EU Protection Directive addresses the topic of how to determine 
identifiability. It says amongst other things: “... whereas, to determine whether a person 
is identifiable account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used 
either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person; ...” 
Bygrave has analysed the term “likely reasonably” and suggested it might introduce 
a twofold criteria for identifiability that involved assessment of probability and 
assessment of difficulty. Bygrave also points out what is of legal essence in the EU 
Data Protection Directive is the potential identifiability rather than actually succeeding 
in identification.138 Bygrave states that “likely reasonably” usually can not be inclusive 
of unauthorised and/or illegal access. Because often “...illegal means will be unexpected 
or unusual means...”139 so not to be likely reasonably or expected. Still Bygrave 
interprets the aim of recital 26 such that “the probability criterion should be given 
priority over the legality criterion in the event of conflict;”140 Meaning that if a person 
has capability and illegal access is probable then that should play a significant part in 
determining identifiability. 
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An information system is only as strong as its weakest link. A data controller for a 
valuable and extensive database with sensitive personal information surely must 
anticipate a possible break-in to the database. It is an assessment to what extent the 
controller must go in ensuring suitable safeguards for unidentifiability. Recital 26 gives 
a wide range for determining identifiability by referring to “the controller or any other 
person.” 
In the Health Sector Database decision, the District Court found that cumulative 
safeguards as listed in section 3.2.2 were satisfactory to determine that data subjects 
were unidentifiable in the sense of the law, because it was not reasonably likely, 
without considerable effort, that the data subjects could be identified. The Supreme 
Court disagreed with this assessment.  
5.12.3 Concept of Suitable Safeguards 
The concept of suitable safeguards has been mentioned repeatedly in previous 
sections. It is clear that “suitable safeguards” carried considerable weight in both the 
Census Act decision and the Health Sector Database decision. The Federal 
Constitutional Court even went as far as stating that suitable safeguards were a 
prerequisite to the right to informational self-determination as mentioned in section 
5.10. It is more difficult for a data subject to insist there has been an infringement of 
his/her informational self-determination and/or right to privacy if an Act has clear 
provisions on unidentifiability and suitable safeguards. If the data subject is ensured of 
unidentifiability by law, his/her private interests weigh less when using the balancing 
test.141 This assurance of unidentifiability can turn out to be a weak link such as was 
seen in the decision of the Icelandic Supreme Court on the Health Sector Database and 
was discussed in section 5.11. 
The European Court of Human Rights has referred to adequate safeguards as a part 
of the “in accordance with the law” criterion as will be discussed in section 5.12.4. 
Suitable safeguards have been one of the fundamentals of European data protection for 
quite a while and now it has been legalized in the EU Data Protection Directive. 
Although the concept is not defined in Art. 2 among other definitions, it is mentioned 
and referred to often both in the recitals and in the provisions. The author chooses to use 
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the term suitable safeguards because that is the term that is most often used in the EU 
Data Protection Directive. The terms used vary. For example in Art. 6(1)b and 6(1)e it 
is “appropriate safeguards”, in Art. 8(4) and (5) it is “suitable safeguards”, in Art. 13(2) 
it is “adequate legal safeguards”. It is uncertain if any special meaning should be 
interpreted into this variation of term use. The addition of the term “legal” to the 
“adequate safeguards” in Art. 13(2) can indicate that in other provisions suitable 
safeguards are not only referring to legal standards but also organizational and technical 
standards. In Art. 8(5) the terms used are “suitable specific safeguards.” By using 
“specific” instead of “legal” one might interpret it as it were sufficient to have the 
safeguards specified somewhere else than in statutes. On the other hand, the fact that it 
is stated in Art. 8, the provision about processing of sensitive personal data, makes that 
interpretation doubtful since sensitive data are to be subject to stricter rules than other 
personal data. The Icelandic Supreme Court emphasized the need that suitable 
safeguards were addressed in the Act and not in the operation license or easily 
changeable work rules.142 
Co-ordinated term use gives a more solid definition so perhaps the authors of the 
EU Data Protection Directive wanted to have some variation in emphasis. Adding a 
definition of the concept in Art. 2 is something to think about when revising the 
Directive.  
The EU Data Protection Directive adds “subject to suitable safeguards” when 
permitting an exemption to a rule. It is each member state’s responsibility to decide if 
safeguards are suitable in each case. Both the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany 
and the Supreme Court in Iceland decided in the cases that are here for analysis that 
there was a lack of suitable safeguards by each nation’s legislator. Appropriate 
safeguards are a pre-requisite to further processing of personal data for scientific and 
statistical purpose according to Art. 6(1)b of the EU Data Protection Directive. If 
suitable safeguards are not in place, the data subjects’ fundamental rights can override 
legitimate interests of the data controller for processing of personal data.143 
It says in the recitals: “(29) Whereas the further processing of personal data for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes is not generally to be considered 
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incompatible with the purposes for which the data have previously been collected 
provided that Member States furnish suitable safeguards; whereas these safeguards 
must in particular rule out the use of the data in support of measures or decisions 
regarding any particular individual;” This recital gives an important clue as to what 
should be the main aim of suitable safeguards. Which is to ensure unidentifiability of 
data subjects so their participation will not affect them in any way and their personal 
data can not be used against them in separate and unrelated matters. 
Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party emphasized the need for transparency in an 
electronic health record system and suggested that the safeguards of such systems 
should “preferably be laid down in a special comprehensive legal framework.”144 This 
supports the decision of the Icelandic Supreme Court that the Health Sector Database 
Act was too open and lacking clear provisions on necessary suitable safeguards. The 
utilization of the Health Sector Database was in fact only addressed in one provision, 
Art. 10 of the Act. 
5.12.4 Clarity of legal framework 
At the end of section 5.10.2 attention is drawn to the limitations that are 
applicable for Art. 8-11 of the Convention. It is necessary to deliberate further on the 
expression “in accordance with the law” which is mentioned in Art. 8(2) of the 
Convention. This criterion is in fact about the “quality of law” and not only about 
being literally in conformity with the law.145 The European Court of Human Rights 
examines a) accessibility, b) predictability, and c) adequate safeguards, when 
assessing the use of this criterion.146 Meaning that the law must provide adequate 
safeguards, be accessible for citizens, and formulated in a way that allows citizens to 
reasonably foresee the consequences of a given action.147 The Strasbourg Court stated 
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in Olsson (No. 1) v. Sweden, that the “in accordance with the law” expression: “...thus 
implies that there must be a measure of protection in domestic law against arbitrary 
interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by, inter alia, paragraph 
1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)”.148  
In recital 28 of the EU Data Protection Directive it is stressed that the purpose 
for personal data processing must be explicit and decided at the time of data 
collection.149 Art. 10 of the Health Sector Database Act is a rather open provision, for 
example by allowing a merger of the Health Sector Database with other databases 
such as databases of genetic and genealogical data. The reason for this is probably 
that the legislator defined the health data unidentifiable and therefore did not regard it 
as personal data with strict conditions on explicit consent and purpose. The District 
Court agreed with the legislator but the Supreme Court disagreed. 
The analysis so far has showed that the Courts in both the Health Sector 
Database decision and the Census Act decision used the “in accordance with the law” 
criterion when they decided that the legal foundation had to be constitutional, 
unambiguous in purpose and content, and provide suitable safeguards. 
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6 Conclusion 
As a part of human dignity and a right to freely develop one’s own personality, the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Germany gave sound reasoning that individuals should 
have a right to decide for themselves what and when they disclose personal information 
to others. It is not an unlimited right but needs to undergo a balancing test and weighing 
of interests similar as in Art. 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights about 
the right to private life. Even though there has been an infringement of an individual’s 
right it can be necessary and justifiable to let certain public interests prevail under 
certain circumstances.  
There is emphasis on the existence of suitable safeguards in the statute at hand. The 
EU Data Protection Directive gives valuable guidelines for assessing what falls within 
the suitable safeguards term although the Directive would be even more helpful if it 
were defined clearly. 
Implementing suitable safeguards can be difficult like the Health Sector Database 
decision shows. One can wonder in how much detail it is reasonable to tackle assurance 
of unidentifiability in legislation. The Icelandic Supreme Court raised the standard from 
what the District Court felt was sufficient. Without saying it in so many words, the 
Health Sector Database decision revealed the necessity of interdisciplinary work of 
lawyers and technicians for statute preparation. This is something that legislators may 
have to consider even more than ever nowadays and certainly in the future. The law 
needs to have room for technical development within its provisions and simultaneously 
have some minimum standard for protecting the fundamental rights of the data subjects. 
Letting public interest prevail over private interests should only happen if suitable 
safeguards, legal and technical, are in place.  
Both decisions confirm that in order for a statute to be constitutional in regards to 
informational self-determination and privacy it is of great importance that the collection 
and processing of personal data has a specific and unambiguous purpose. That is one of 
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the main rule of data protection law150 and is implemented in Art. 8(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU.151 
Then there is the factor of data subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy that can 
and most likely has great impact on the individual deciding to disclose his/her personal 
information or not. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg began using the 
reasonable expectations test only 10 years ago. It has still only been used in a handful of 
decisions so time will tell how valuable that test will be for determining privacy in the 
future.  
The District Court in Reykjavik, Iceland referred to reasonable expectations and 
gave a detailed description of their opinion what should be regarded as unidentifiable in 
the sense of the law.152 It would have been better if the Icelandic Supreme Court had 
gone through this reasoning of the District Court to give a more solid ground for their 
opinion of why this was insufficient. Many questions were left unanswered by the 
Icelandic Supreme Court, such as what involves a real risk of unauthorized access and 
what would be sufficient suitable safeguards in the opinion of the Court. The Court did 
not explore the discrepancy in the Health Sector Database Act about one-way-
encryption in Art. 7(2) when Art. 8(1) of the same Act gives the data subjects the right 
to have their already existing and encrypted data erased.  
The bottom-line is that the Supreme Court concluded that there had been a breach of 
the appellant’s information privacy. Even though some would think it was far fetched 
that an individual can reach his/her private interests into the informational sphere of 
his/her deceased close relatives. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has 
acknowledged this can be problematic in relation to genetic data. It suggests using the 
balancing test to weigh interests in relation to the principle of proportionality on a case 
by case basis.153 
                                                 
150 Bygrave: Data Protection Law – Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, 2002, p. 61 for a 
discussion on the principle of purpose specification. 
151 The first sentence of Art. 8(2) of the Charter states: “Such data must be processed fairly and for 
specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law.” 
152 ISC, case 151/2003, p. 4181. 
153 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Genetic Data, 2004, p. 9. 
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The Icelandic Health Sector Database decision did not refer directly to a right to 
informational self-determination but such a right is implicit in the application of the 
right to privacy in the decision. 
 
The Census Act decision gave precedence for individuals having a constitutional 
right to decide for themselves if, what, and when to disclose their personal information 
subject to limitations. Important European legal instruments confirm this evolution. 
Citizens in Europe have now, more than before, the opportunity to decide if they want 
to become data subjects and have the choice to withdraw their consent. It is this 
author’s thesis that informational self-determination can be regarded to fall within the 
scope of Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and should become 
recognized as a fundamental right in additional European countries besides Germany.  
In this research, the author only found cases from the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg that support this thesis indirectly. There has not yet been filed a 
complaint based on a breach of informational self-determination which is claimed to be 
protected by the above Art. 8 of the Convention. On the other hand the author bases this 
thesis on various clues in recent decisions and EU development. Such as the Court’s 
intent not to give exhaustive definition of private life154 and emphasis on the right to 
freely develop one’s own personality.155 A very important clue is to be found in Pretty 
v. United Kingdom. The terminally ill applicant wanted to get acknowledged a right to 
commit suicide with assistance since she was too ill to complete it herself. The 
applicant argued that a right to self-determination was like “a thread through the 
Convention as a whole” although especially it was Art. 8 of the Convention that 
conferred it.156 The Court stated in relation to this: “Although no previous case has 
established as such any right to self-determination as being contained in Article 8 of the 
Convention, the Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.”157  
                                                 
154 See for example: Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R, para. 61; X and Y v. the 
Netherlands, 1985, Series A 91, para. 22. 
155 See for example: Botta v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R, para. 32; X v. Iceland, Application No. 6825/74, 
D.R. 5 p. 86, European Commission of H.R. 
156 Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 17 and 58. 
157 Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61. 
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The Court acknowledged personal autonomy as to fall within the protection of Art. 
8 but neither included a right to self-determination nor excluded it. This conclusion of 
the Court must be interpreted with regards to the special circumstances of the Pretty 
case. The Court in fact did not address the topic of self-determination beside what was 
quoted above but focused on if a right to die was protected by Art. 8 of the Convention. 
This case was more about a right to make decisions on one’s own actions instead of 
personal information or in other words about the decision-making aspect of the right to 
privacy, according to Rehm.158 Is there or should there be any difference between the 
right to self-determination in relation to action on the one hand, or information on the 
other hand, is debatable and outside the scope of this thesis.  
Even though the European Court of Human Rights has not addressed the concept of 
informational self-determination directly the author feels it is only a matter of time until 
it will in today’s information and technology society. After studying recent case law on 
Art. 8 of the Convention it would not be surprising that under specific circumstances the 
Strasbourg Court would recognize this right to fall within the scope of Art. 8 on respect 
for private life, since it is so closely related to a person’s autonomy, human dignity, and 
free development of one’s personality. Of course subject to the the balancing test of Art. 
8(2) of the Convention. 
 
It is of interest that the Federal Constitutional Court took such a bold decision based 
on a futuristic vision of automatic processing in modern society and what impact the 
Court presumed for example data sharing, merging, and profiling could have. This 
insight can be summarized in these words of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany: “Insignificant data thus no longer exist.”159 The author agrees with the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s statement that all information can be of significance in 
some respect. To build and preserve a society of free development of personality, where 
individuals have a right to privacy and informational self-determination, it is necessary 
to have boundaries on personal data processing as the term is defined in Art. 2(b) in the 
EU Data Protection Directive. 
                                                 
158 Cf. section 2.2. 
159 Riedel: FCC, K, HRLJ, vol. 5, No 1, 1984, p. 102. 
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The right to informational self-determination does not have to be regarded as a 
separate right as long as it is agreed upon that the fundamental right to privacy includes 
freedom of deciding if, how, when, and to whom an individual discloses his personal 
information within certain limitations. Other countries should take Germany’s 
precedence and accept it as a fundamental right. In a fast evolving information society it 
is of great value to the common European citizen and assists in keeping human right 
standards and data protection level high.   
The importance of data protection is now so recognized that it stands on its own. 
Data protection is no longer just a part of a right to privacy. There are national data 
protection laws, the EU Data Protection Directive and Art. 8 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights which now is enclosed as part II of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. This evolution shows also the growing recognition of 
informational self-determination. In Art. 8(2) of the Charter (Art. II-68(2) of the TCE) it 
says that data processing must be fair, specific, and based on consent or other legitimate 
basis in law. Art. I-51 of the TCE is also about protection of personal data.160 Art. II-63 
of the TCE is about respect for personal integrity and in paragraph 2 it says: “In the 
fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular: a) the free 
and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures laid down 
by law;”161 Consent and therefore informational self-determination, subject to 
limitation, are regarded as one of the fundamental rights in the Charter and TCE. 
A right to informational self-determination is a part of the essence of human dignity 
in the author’s opinion and should at least be regarded as encompassed by the 
fundamental right to privacy and should even become recognized as a separate right on 
its own. 
                                                 
160 TCE, Official Journal of the European Union, C 310, Vol. 47, 16.12.2004. p. 36. 
161 TCE, Official Journal of the European Union, C 310, Vol. 47, 16.12.2004, p. 42. Art II-63 of the TCE 
is the same as Art. 3 of the Charter. Art. II-67 in TCE, about the right to respect for private and family 
life, is the same as Art. 7 of the Charter. Art. II-61 of the TCE, about the right to human dignity is the 
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